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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

LEGER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ROBERTS, INC.,

CASE NO. 13737

Defendant-Respondent,
vs.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Added.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Roberts, Inc., defendant and respondent herein, respectfully petitions the court for a rehearing on the following
grounds:
1.

The court's holding, with respect to the proper pro-

cedure for filing a verified memorandum of costs after the
amendment of findings of fact, is ambiguous and should be clarified to prevent prejudicial confusion in the district courts.
2.

The court's holding, in reversing the allowance of

attorney's fees for the failure of respondent to include them
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in its cost bill, is unduly harsh and contrary to the compensatory purpose of §14-1-8, U.C.A. in the instant case
where there was no dispute concerning the application of the
statute and where the plaintiff was not prejudiced or surprised
by the award.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
NATURE OF CASE
This was an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment for
defendant on a counterclaim concerning breach of contract in
an action tried before the court wherein defendant was
awarded its attorney*s fees pursuant to statute (§14-1-8,

DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
The court held that the judgment of the trial court was
correct and should be affirmed but reversed that judgment
with respect to the award of attorney's fees to defendant.
The primary ground upon which the court refused to award defendant its attorney's fees was defendants failure to include
them in its memorandum of costs.

Respondent seeks a rehearing

to re-examine the court's disposition of the trial court's
judgment with respect to the award of these attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 9, 1971, appellant (Leger) and respondent
(Roberts) entered into a contract under which respondent
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was to perform mechanical and plumbing work on maintenance
stations at Salt Lake City, and Manila, Utah.

In connection

with this contract appellant, as principal, and United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (USF&G), as surety, executed and
delivered to the State of Utah a labor and material payment
bond pursuant to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 5, U.C.A. 1953 (as amended).
Appellant commenced an action against respondent claiming $2,782.00 allegedly due from respondent under the terms
of the contract, and respondent (1) counterclaimed for
$14,172.04 owed to it under the contract, plus interest and
attorney's fees, (2) joined USF&G as an added defendant, and
(3) claimed $3,249.77 due from appellant on other jobs.

The

district court awarded respondent a joint and several judgment against appellant and its surety on respondent's first
claim in the sum of $8,494.95, and against the appellant only
on respondent's second claim for $782.25. This court affirmed
these portions of the district court's judgment.
In its answer and counterclaim, respondent made specific
reference to the provisions of §14-1-5 (Answer, 1[7) and in
its prayer asked for "a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed
by the court on its first claim" (Answer, p.3).

Appellant's

reply to the counterclaim specifically admitted paragraph 7
of the counterclaim and did not deny respondent's prayer for

- 3 -
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attorneyfs fees.
At the trial respondent introduced expert testimony as
to attorney's fees (Tr. 2d day, p«129~134; Tr, 3d day, p.l5) and appellant, while fully exercising his right to crossexamine the witness and examine the documentary evidence/
never objected to the relevance or propriety of the testimony.
Appellant's only objection was with respect to documentation
supporting the amount of time spent in preparing the litigation* and this evidence was subsequently produced by responder
and received in evidence.

Thus/ the only controversy concerni

attorney^ fees centered around the reasonableness of the
fee and the amount of time expended by the attorneys.
3d day, p.2-5).

(Tr.

This controversy was properly resolved by

the trier of fact in favor of respondent.
The district court's original judgment was filed on
March 19/ 1974, and* within the five (5) day period mandated
by Rule 54(d)(2), U.R.C.P., respondent filed a memorandum of
costs.

The memorandum did not include'attorney's fees because

they were not awarded in the trial court's memorandum decisioi
and thus excluded from the original findings and conclusions
of the court.

The trial court's memorandum decision denied

attorney's fees on the basis that there was no contractual
provision therefor.

The respondent, therefore, had no basis

to determine the amount of the reasonable fee to be taxed as
cost at the time the memorandum of cost was filed.
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On motion respondent requested the court to modify the
findings and amend the judgment, since the trial court had
overlooked §14-1-8.

After hearing, the court amended its

judgment and findings to include an award of $2,607.50 to
respondent as attorney's fees.

The fees were assessed pursuant

to §14-1-8 as a cost of suit to be borne by the losing party.
Since there had been adequate testimony and cross-examination
in open court concerning the amount of the fees in question,
respondent did not file an amended cost bill but relied on
the findings as sufficient verification of the cost of attorney's
fees.

This court reversed the district court's judgment with

respect to the award of attorney's fees as inappropriate
since the fees were not included in respondent's memorandum
of cost.

Respondent now petitions for a rehearing on this

portion of the court's decision.
ARGUMENT
I
THE COURT'S HOLDING, WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPER
PROCEDURE FOR FILING A VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AFTER
THE AMENDMENT OF FINDINGS OF FACT, IS AMBIGUOUS AND SHOULD
BE CLARIFIED TO PREVENT PREJUDICIAL CONFUSION IN THE DISTRICT COURTS.
Even if this court should decline to modify its opinion
with respect to the award of attorney's fees, it should^clarify
its opinion so as to avoid confusion and the potential for prejudice in future litigation involving §14-1-8 and other such
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statutes (see e.g. §§38-1-18 and 34-27-1)*
This court!s opinion states:
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
with respect to "Costs/1 provides that one claiming them must, "within five days" after judgment,
serve the other party and file with the court a
verified memorandum of items. Roberts did not include any attorney's fees in his cost bill within
the five-day prescribed period, - and could not
have done so because the original judgment awarded
none. He sought the fees nine days after the judgment and four days after the required cost bill
filing date. The attorney's fees were incorporated
in the judgment and that is the present state of
the record. The judgment cannot be amended again
on motion because it is too late. As a matter of
fact the judgment for attorney's fees is invalid
since there was nothing in the contract providing
for such an award.
This portion of the court's opinion suggests that unless the
prevailing party files a complete cost bill within five days
from the entry of the original judgment, the party waives his
right to have the court tax additional costs to the losing
party, even though the prevailing party can move to amend the
judgment and findings within ten days after they have been
docketed, and, if approved, these amendments may provide a
basis for awarding additional costs to the prevailing party.
The quoted language does not suggest how respondent could have
preserved its right to the attorney's fees when the fees
were neither assessed nor included in the court's findings
until after the five-day period for filing a cost bill had
lapsed.

When statutory attorney's fees were awarded in the

- 6 -
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district court's judgment, the court was merely reiterating
the assessment of the fee which was stated in the amended
findings, for, as this court has stated, unless the parties
otherwise agree the district court must take evidence on the
issue of reasonable attorney's fees and must make findings
thereon.

Blain Enterprises v. M-B Super Tire Market, Inc.,

28 Utah 2d 192, 499 P.2d 1294' (1972); Provo City Corp. v.
Cropper, 27 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972); F.M.A. Financial
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965).
As this court correctly noted, the district court could not
award attorney's fees as part of the judgment absent a contractual agreement, but it could and did assess the amount
of the fee which it included in the findings.
Under current practice, the "reasonableness" of an award
of attorney's fees is always a question of fact which demands
a finding from the trier of fact in light of the novelty of
the case, the time devoted to preparation, and the relative
skill of the attorney.

Evidence customarily is introduced at

trial with respect to this question and the appropriate award
is included in the verdict or the findings.

The appropriate

amount can then be incorporated into the prevailing party's
memorandum of costs. A party cannot file a memorandum of
costs until those costs are determined, yet this court's
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opinion seems to penalize the respondent for failing to do
something he could not do at the time required.
Theoretically there should be no need to file a cost
bill with respect to costs which have been determined through
testimony at trial*
to

The purpose of a verified cost bill is

avoid a needless expenditure of court time with respect

to matters which are easily documented and about which there
is seldom any dispute.

(e.g. filing fees, costs of service

complaints, subpoenas, witness fees, etc.).

The verified

memorandum provides the losing party with an opportunity to
have the items of cost presented under oath and subjected to
challenge.

But, when testimony concerning attorney's fees is

presented in court, the opposing party may exercise his right
to cross-examine or object and thereby challenge the proposed
assessment.

Is any valid purpose satisifed by including the

fees in a cost bill when testimony concerning them has already
been presented?

Such a procedure could only spawn confusion,

duplication, and additional controversy.If this court's holding remains the law, a prevailing
party will lose his statutory right to an attorney's fee, if,
through inadvertence, the amount of the fee is omitted from
the findings and those findings are not amended until -after
the five-day period for filing a cost bill has lapsed.

Appare

ly, this would be true even though there was adequate testimor

- 8 -
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at trial concerning the reasonableness of the fee, neither
party was in any way surprised or prejudiced by the courtfs
determination and the fees were eventually included in
amended findings.

It is unlikely that this court intends

such a harsh result for such an unavoidable omission.
To avoid this dilemma, future litigants will be required
to include their attorney's fees in their initial cost bill
whether or not such fees are included in the findings and
whether or not there previously has been testimony concerning
the reasonableness of the fee.

The predictable results of

this procedure will be two-fold:

First, litigants will be

encouraged to avoid placing testimony in evidence at the
trial concerning statutory attorneyfs fees and will instead
merely itemize them in their memorandum of costs; and,
second, the cost bill will become a major source of contention
initiating objections and motions for the court to tax costs
with the inevitable prolongation of litigation and the necessity for post-trial hearings to resolve matters which could
be more economically disposed of at trial. Moreover, this
procedure would be inconsistent with this court's prior decisions, supra, which require testimony as to reasonable
attorney's fees be presented at trial.
Respondent urges this court to reconsider the policies
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and purposes underlying the timely application of a verified
memorandum of costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) and to adopt a
holding which more closely conforms to these policies.

In

the interest of clarity and practicality, respondent suggests
that the court amend its holding by either (a) expressly
permitting a party to file an amended memorandum of costs
within five (5) days after amended findings have been filed
whenever the amended findings affect the taxing of costs, or
(b) expressly declining to require a memorandum of costs with
respect to those items of cost upon which there has been open
testimony and written findings.

In these latter cases the

findings can stand as a superior substitute for the memorandum
of costs.

Respondent believes that these suggestions will

clarify the intent of the court's holding and will serve
to better advance the purposes of the cost bill procedure.
Since attorneyBs fees are statutorily taxed as costs in
areas other than suits on bonds (see e.g., mechanics liens
§38-1-18, and suits for wages §34-27-1), the instant decision
provides an appropriate opportunity for the court to announce
the proper procedure and policy to be followed in these cases.
II :"
THE COURT'S HOLDING, IN REVERSING THE ALLOWANCE 0F~
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENT TO INCLUDE
THEM IN ITS COST BILL, IS UNDULY HARSH AND CONTRARY TO THE
COMPENSATORY PURPOSE OF §14-1-8, U.C.A., IN THE INSTANT CASE
WHERE THERE IS NO DISPUTE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATUTE AND WHERE THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT PREJUDICED OR SURPRISED IN THE AWARD.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Respondent sought and was awarded attorney's fees
pursuant to §14-1-8, U.C.A., since the action was brought,
in part, on a payment bond and since Roberts was the prevailing party in the action.

The appellant had adequate

notice of respondent's demand for attorney's fees since this
request was included in the prayer of respondent's counterclaim.

In Tiano v. Elsensohn, 520 P.2d 358 Ore. (1974) where

the losing party objected to the award of statutory attorney's
fees for the prevailing party's failure to plead them
specifically, the court held:
Because attorney's fees are part of costs, it
is unnecessary for plaintiff to make any more
mention of them in his complaint than he would
have to make concerning other items of costs.
They need only be requested in the prayer.
In the immediate case, respondent not only requested attorney's
fees in its prayer, but introduced testimony at trial concerning the reasonableness of the fee. Appellant has never
disputed the applicability of this statute*

Nevertheless,

respondent must bear the costs of its attorney's fees from
the amount of the contract price awarded in the judgment
because of its failure to itemize the fee in its cost bill*
This court's opinion mandates this result even though the
amount of the fee was verified by testimony in court. An award of costs to the prevailing party is intended
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to "reimburse" the successful party for the expenses incurred in presenting or defending an action or special proceeding and is merely incidental to the judgment in the
actione

Fowler v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414, 290 P. 353 (1930)•

The award of a reasonable attorney's fee as a cost of litigation differs from the award of other costs since the
amount of the cost is not prescribed by statute.

Thusf while

most litigation with respect to statutory costs focuses on
the items of cost, controversy over attorney's fees usually
centers on the amount of the "reasonable" fee and testimony
and findings are inevitably required before attorney's fees
can be taxed as costs. Blain Enterprises v. M-B Super Tire
Market, Inc., supra.
The procedure prescribed by Rule 54(d) (2), U.R.C.P., is
designed to avoid the introduction of evidence with respect
to those items of cost which are clearly provided by statute,
and, a verified memorandum of costs is generally sufficient
evidence of the actual costs incurred without the need to
prove costs in court.

The purpose of the cost bill, there-

fore, is to test the veracity of the author and its contents
which purport to express a true itemization of costs.
v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 380 P.2d 926 (1963).

Barton

When, however,

the parties have subjected their veracity to the rigors of
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the witness stand and to cross-examination/ additional itemization in a verified memorandum of costs does not advance
the purposes for Rule 54(d) (2) but in fact thwarts them*
The procedure which will be required as a result of this
court's decision will prove to be unduly burdensome and a
trap for the unwary.
As this court recognized in Palombi v. D&C Builders,
22 Utah 2d 297f 452 P.2d 325 (1969), the policy of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is one of "liberality" to secure a "just . . . determination of every action."

In that

case, this court permitted the prevailing party to recover
attorney's fees pursuant to §38-1-18, U.C.A., even though
the fees were not specifically requested in the pleadings*
In the instant case, respondent urges this court to exercise
its equitable power and award attorney's fees even though
such were not included in the memorandum of costs because
the policy of Rule 54(d)(2) was fully complied with without
any surprise or prejudice to the appellant.

In the alterna-

tive, respondent requests permission from this court to
amend its memorandum of costs so that the attorney's fees
may properly be included therein.

Respondent seeks this

relief so that the compensatory purpose of §14-1-8 may ~
not be hampered by inadvertence or technical error.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that for the foregoing
reasons the court should reconsider the opinion heretofore
rendered herein and affirm the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the respondent.
DATED this 9th day of June, 1976*
Respectfully submitted,

R« Mont McDowell
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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